Cryptographic Architecture & Threat Model
Everything required to verify how Adamant encrypts, authenticates, wipes, and isolates vaults natively on iOS (CryptoKit) and in our browser tools (WebCrypto).
1. Constant-Size 16-Slot Pool (VaultCore/slots.bin)
Unlike designs that share a device-wide Keychain salt or grow directory pools in bands of 64, Adamant pre-allocates exactly 65,536 bytes (16 × 4,096 B) filled with CSPRNG bytes on first launch. Unused slots hold 4,096 bytes of uniform entropy with zero magic bytes. Every unlock trial-decrypts all 16 slots silently.
| Offset | Length | Field | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| [0 .. 32) | 32 B | patternSalt | Independent per-slot CSPRNG salt for PBKDF2 Pattern KEK |
| [32 .. 44) | 12 B | patternIV | Random AES-256-GCM IV |
| [44 .. 60) | 16 B | patternTag | AES-GCM authentication tag (aad: "adamant-slot-v1") |
| [60 .. 92) | 32 B | wrappedVMK | 256-bit Vault Master Key sealed by Pattern KEK |
| [92 .. 124) | 32 B | recoverySalt | Independent CSPRNG salt for 9-word Recovery KEK |
| [124 .. 136) | 12 B | recoveryIV | Random AES-256-GCM IV |
| [136 .. 152) | 16 B | recoveryTag | AES-GCM tag (aad: "adamant-recovery-v1") |
| [152 .. 184) | 32 B | recoveryWrappedVMK | VMK sealed under 9-word BIP-39 phrase |
| [184 .. 200) | 16 B | vaultUUID | RFC 4122 v4 UUID referencing encrypted manifest |
| [200 .. 201) | 1 B | flags | Bit 0 (0x01) = isDuress flag; upper bits random |
| [201 .. 4096) | 3,895 B | padding | Uniform CSPRNG padding |
2. Chunked Streaming (ADMTBLB1)
Enables constant ~2 MB RAM scrubbing of gigabyte-scale 4K videos via loopback Range streams:
- Header (32 B): "ADMTBLB1" || 12B baseNonce || uint32(65536) || 8B zeros
- chunkIV_i = baseNonce XOR uint64_be(i)
- AAD_i = uint64_be(i) || uint8(isFinal ? 1 : 0)
- Frame_i = uint32_be(ctLen) || AES-256-GCM(VMK, chunkIV_i, P_i, AAD_i)
3. Known Answer Test (KAT) Vector
Reproducible PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 derivation tested automatically in CI (cryptoVectors.test.ts):
Input: adamant:v1:grid5x5:0-1-2-7-12-17
Salt: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
1,000 iters: 04f095854d32ea56c132a03db3a36ee4b24ee62844637a70a835840bf13995db
600,000 iters: 4cc81adb92eb4abe109d8cca15d13be2a899b81963bc467c60f0a48cb0276ef5
4. Honest Forensic Boundaries & Threat Limits
- App Container Ciphertext Presence: A full-disk forensic extraction sees
slots.bin(65,536 B) and opaque.encblobs inVaultCore/blobs/. While 1 active slot vs. 16 is indistinguishable insideslots.bin, separate.manifest.encfiles exist per active vault until a Duress Wipe synchronously unlinks them. - Pattern Entropy: AES-256-GCM uses random 256-bit VMKs, and 600,000 PBKDF2-SHA512 iterations slow cracking sharply—but trivial patterns remain guessable on seized hardware. Use longer multi-turn patterns and enable Stealth Line.
- Unlocked RAM Lifecycle: Decryption runs inside native CryptoKit / JCA process RAM. On backgrounding, manual lock, or Flip/Shake panic, VMKs are overwritten with zeros (
memset_s/Arrays.fill).